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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts all over the world are notoriously rather reluctant to
turn to foreign or international sources, whether statutes, court
decisions, or writings, for inspiration when interpreting their
domestic laws.1 In the rare cases where courts do so, they nor-
mally refer only to legal systems linguistically and culturally
close to their own.2 Even when applying international conven-
* Professor of Law, University of Rome I "La Sapienza"; Chairman of the
Working Group for the Preparation of Principles of International Commercial
Contracts.
1 For a comprehensive overview, see Ulrich Drobnig, General Report: The Use
of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS:
XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3-21 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef
Van Erp eds., Kiuwer Law Int'l 1999).
2 This is particularly true of Anglo-American courts which traditionally refer
mainly, if not exclusively, to decisions rendered in other common law jurisdictions
1
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tions incorporated in their own legal systems, more often than
not, they interpret and supplement them on the basis of princi-
ples and rules of the law of the forum despite the indication con-
tained in most of these conventions that "[i]n [their]
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to [their]
international character and to the need to promote uniformity
in [their] application" and that "[q]uestions concerning matters
governed by [them] which are not expressly settled in [them]
are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on
which [they are] based."3
A significant exception to this general attitude is repre-
sented by a recent decision of the English Court of Appeals. In
ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The Rugby Group Ltd.,4 Lady Justice
Arden, in obiter dictum, criticized some of the traditional rules
on contract interpretation in English law and suggested a possi-
ble change in approach. In support of it, she made express ref-
erence to the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts ("UNIDROIT Principles") 5 as well as to
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
(English decisions). Thus, with respect, in particular to Australian courts, see for
example, Jianfu Chen, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts: Australian Courts
at the Crossroads, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS: XJVTH INTERNA-
TIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 25-57. With respect to
Canadian courts, see for example, H. Patrick Glenn, The Use of Comparative Law
by Common Law Courts in Canada, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS:
XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 59-78. In
addition, civil law courts normally restrict their comparative references to coun-
tries with a common linguistic and legal background. See, e.g., Marc Elvinger, The
Use of Comparative Law by Common Law Courts in Canada, in THE USE OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW BY COURTS: XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 1, at 231-34 (highlighting the fact that the courts in Luxembourg regu-
larly refer to French and Belgian decisions).
3 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, art. 7, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/text/treaty.html [hereinafter CISGI. For a criti-
cal analysis of the different approaches taken by domestic courts in interpreting
and supplementing CISG, see F. Ferrari, Gap-filling and Interpretation of the
CISG: Overview of International Case Law, in REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES IN-
TERNATIONALES 221-30 (2003).
4 ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The Rugby Group Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 69 (ap-
peal taken from Eng.).
5 See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts with
Official Commentary (1994), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.
international.commercial.contracts.principles. 1994.commented/ [hereinafter
UNIDROIT].
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tional Sale of Goods ("CISG"). 6 The case is all the more remark-
able not only because English courts are known for being
particularly parsimonious in using foreign sources other than
those of other common law jurisdictions, 7 but also, and most im-
portantly, because the dispute was a purely domestic one with
no international connotations. The case referred to two interna-
tional instruments, one of which - the UNIDROIT Principles -
has no binding force at all, while the other - the CISG - is not
in force in the United Kingdom.
In this note - which I dedicate to the memory E. Allan
Farnsworth, a highly esteemed scholar and personal friend who
played a decisive role in the preparation of both the UNIDROIT
Principles and CISG - I shall provide a summary of the
ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The Rugby Group Ltd. case (Section II)
followed by a brief description of the relevant English rules on
contract interpretation under consideration (Section III) as
compared to those reflected in both the UNIDROIT Principles
and CISG (Section IV).
II. PROFORCE RECRUIT LTD. V. THE RUGBY GROUP LTD.:
FACTS AND RULINGS
ProForce Recruit Ltd. ("ProForce"), an employment and re-
cruitment agency, entered into a contract with the Rugby Group
Ltd. ("Rugby Cement"), a cement manufacturer, for the supply
of labor, personnel, and cleaning equipment for a period of time
of two years.8 The written contract provided that during this
two year period ProForce would hold "preferred supplier status"
and contained a clause stating "[t]his Agreement... constitutes
the entire contract between the parties and supersedes all prior
representations, agreements, negotiations or understandings
6 See CISG, supra note 3.
7 This is because - to quote a particularly eminent English judge - in the
past, "it was an almost universal article of faith that English law and legal institu-
tions were without peer in the world, with very little to be usefully learned from
others." T. H. Bingham, "There is a World Elsewhere?". The Changing Perspectives
of English Law, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513, 514 (1992). On the recent increasing
change in the attitude of English courts in this respect, see Esin Oricu, Compara-
tive Law in British Courts, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS: X1VTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CoMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 252-87.
8 ProForce, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 69, [6]-[11] (Eng.).
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whether oral or in writing."9 A few months after the conclusion
of the contract Rugby Cement began to use other employment
agencies to satisfy requirements exceeding those provide for in
its contract with ProForce. ProForce then accused Rugby Ce-
ment of breach of contract and claimed that, under the terms of
their agreement, Rugby Cement should have first asked
ProForce to provide its additional personnel requirements
before looking elsewhere. 10 Rugby Cement objected that the
term "preferred supplier status" in its natural and ordinary
meaning only conferred on ProForce the commercial advantage
of being a supplier of labor approved by Rugby Cement and with
whom Rugby Cement could choose to place business though
without any obligation to do so." ProForce insisted that, ac-
cording to the meaning ascribed to the term by the parties
through the individuals who conducted the negotiations and/or
the representation made as to its meaning by Rugby Cement,
Rugby Cement was obliged to offer ProForce the opportunity to:
1) supply contract labor and hire equipment in preference to
other suppliers and 2) not engage other suppliers of contract la-
bor and hire equipment without first having offered ProForce a
reasonable opportunity to satisfy Rugby Cement's requirements
in such respects.' 2
A decision by the Senior Master to dismiss Rugby Cement's
application to have the case determined summarily was over-
turned by the English High Court (Queen's Bench Division).' 3
Justice Field, relying on a series of precedential cases, including
Lord Wilberfors' Prenn v. Simmonds' 4 and Lord Hoffmann's In-
vestors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building
Society,' 5 which excluded the admissibility of evidence of pre-
contractual negotiations for the purpose of interpreting a writ-
ten contract, held that ProForce was not entitled to adduce evi-
dence of the negotiations between the parties and their
subjective declarations of intent in support of the meaning it
9 Id. [11].
10 Id. [14].
11 Id.
12 Id. [19].
13 Rugby Group Ltd. v. ProForce Ltd., [2005] EWHC 70 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
14 Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 3 All E.R. 237, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381 (Eng.).
15 Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. W. Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y, [1998] 1 All E.R.
98, [1998] W.L.R. 896 (Eng.).
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claimed the term "preferred supplier status" had for them in the
case at hand.16 Moreover, the parties, by stating in their con-
tract that "[t]his Agreement [ ... ] supersedes all prior repre-
sentations, agreements, negotiations or understandings," made
it clear that, between themselves, all things superseded had no
bearing on the meaning of their agreement. 17
On ProForce's appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously
overruled the High Court's decision and deferred the case to
trial for further findings of fact concerning the meaning the par-
ties intended to attach to the expression in question in the
course of pre-contractual negotiations."' In his opinion, Lord
Justice Mummery first pointed out that the term "preferred
supplier status" did not have an obvious natural and ordinary
meaning and that its meaning could only be properly deter-
mined in the context of the agreement read as a whole and of all
the surrounding circumstances.' 9 He then denied that the ex-
ploration of the surrounding circumstances, including pre-con-
tractual negotiations, was completely ruled out by the
authorities. He referred in particular to Judge Kerr in
Partenreedesei Karen Oltmann v. Scarsdale Shipping Co.
Ltd.,20 as well as to Chitty on Contracts, 21 and to a recent extra-
judicial writing by Lord Nicholls, all admitting evidence of what
the parties said in negotiations at least where it is sought to
show that the parties negotiated on an agreed basis that the
words used bore a particular meaning.22 Lord Justice Mum-
mery concluded that in the case at hand any evidence of pre-
contract negotiations relevant for the purpose of ascertaining
the meaning of the term "preferred supplier status" also should
be admitted. 23 Nor was the "entire agreement clause" con-
tained in the contract an impediment: indeed, in his view "it
16 Rugby Group Ltd., [2005] EWHC 70 (Q.B.) [211-[22].
17 ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The Rugby Group Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 69, [30]
(Eng.) (quoting Partenreederei Karen Oltmann v. Scarsdale Shipping Co. Ltd.,
[1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. EWIHC (Comm) 708, 712, [311 (Eng.)).
18 Id. [36], [38].
19 Id. [24]-[251.
20 Partenreederei Karen Oltmann v. Scarsdale Shipping Co. Ltd., [1976] 2
Lloyd's Rep. EWHC (Comm) 708, 712, [31] (Eng.).
21 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS (Hugh Beale et al. eds., Sweet &
Maxwell Ltd. 2004) (1826) [hereinafter CHITTY ON CONTRACTS].
22 ProForce, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 69, [30]-[36].
23 Id.
20071
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[was] reasonably arguable" that by this clause the parties in-
tended to exclude "ascertaining the contents of [their] written
contract ... by reference to prior representations, agreements,
negotiations and understandings," but not to inhibit "ascertain-
ing the meaning of a term contained in [their] written contract
by reference to pre-contract materials."24
Yet, it is the opinion of Lady Justice Arden that is particu-
larly significant in the present context. She concurred with Lord
Justice Mummery that, since the parties had used a very unu-
sual combination of words "preferred supplier status" without
any explanation in the contract, it was reasonably arguable
that, on their true interpretation, those words bore the meaning
that the parties in common gave them in their pre-contractual
communications. 25 The court, in receiving evidence concerning
those communications, would be hearing that evidence not with
a subjective view of the parties' intent for purposes of interpre-
tation, but for the purpose of identifying the meaning that the
parties in effect incorporated into their agreement. 26 However,
Lady Justice Arden, though admitting that in order to decide
the case at hand it was unnecessary to go further than such
evidence, stated that "[e]vidence as to negotiations between the
parties to a contract [... ] may be admissible for the purposes of
interpretation in wider circumstances than [those] indicated
above."27 Recalling that Lord Nicholls in his writing cited by
Lord Justice Mummery also had suggested that the rule exclud-
ing evidence of pre-contractual negotiations on questions of in-
terpretation should be relaxed, and that even Lord Hoffmann in
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Build-
ing Society had recognized that the boundaries of the rule were
unclear, Lady Justice Arden pointed out:
The exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations is not on the face of
it consistent with the general principle that a contract should be
interpreted in the light of its context, nor, on the face of it, is the
application of a meaning which is not that which the parties
24 Id. [39]-[41].
25 Id. [45]-[60].
26 Id. [55].
27 Id. [57].
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themselves gave to a term consistent with the general approach of
contract law, which is to respect party autonomy. 28
If the ruling of Justice Field in the first instance expressed
the general position in law, the result would be that the parties'
meaning would be adopted if they defined the term in their
written contract, but not if they only did so in the course of pre-
contractual negotiations. Moreover, in that latter event, the
meaning given to the term by the court would prevail and, if the
court's meaning was different from that on which both parties
in fact proceeded, a party would be able to avoid its contractual
obligations deriving from the parties' meaning. In defining
these results as "anomalous," Lady Justice Arden concluded
that, if in interpretation questions evidence of pre-contractual
negotiations is to be admitted in the future on a wider basis
than the law presently permitted, "careful consideration may
have to be given to the aims to be achieved by contractual inter-
pretation and the precise extent to which the law requires an
objective interpretation. '29 She continued that "[i]t may be ap-
propriate to consider a number of international instruments ap-
plying to contracts," such as "[t]he UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts [which] give primacy to
the common intention of the parties and on questions of inter-
pretation require regard to be had to all the circumstances, in-
cluding the pre-contractual negotiations of the parties (Article
4.3)."30 Moreover, Lady Justice Arden stated "[tihe UN Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980)
[which] provides that a party's intention is in certain circum-
stances relevant and, in determining that intention, regard is to
be had to all relevant circumstances, including preliminary
negotiations."3 1
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT UNDER ENGLISH LAw
The question of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to in-
terpret a written agreement is undoubtedly one of the most con-
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
2007]
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troversial issues of contract interpretation in English law.32
The traditional literal approach to contract interpretation is
that a contract has to be interpreted according to the ordinary
grammatical meaning of the words used therein. Only in very
limited circumstances can the court go outside "the four cor-
ners" of the document has long been abandoned and replaced by
a more flexible "purposive" approach. 33 Yet, the extent to which
extrinsic evidence is admitted as an aid to the interpretation of
a written contract is still controversial.
To be sure, nowadays it is generally accepted that there
need not be ambiguity or uncertainty in the text before extrinsic
evidence will be admitted. Since, to quote Lord Hoffmann's fa-
mous statement in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West
Bromwich Building Society,34 "[i]nterpretation is the ascertain-
ment of the meaning which the document would convey to a rea-
sonable person having all the background knowledge which
would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situ-
ation in which they were at the time of the contract,"35 a court
can always look beyond the language of the document and see
what the circumstances were with reference to which the words
were used. However, in the words of Lord Steyn in Sirius Int'l
Ins. Co. (Publ) v. FAI General Ins. Ltd.,36 "[t]he aim of the in-
quiry is not to probe the real intention of the parties but to as-
certain the contextual meaning of the relevant contractual
32 The question should not be confused with the other conceptually distinct
(though sometimes associated) question of the so-called parol evidence rule. In-
deed, whereas the former relates to contract interpretation and arises because of
the limits inherent in the strictly literal approach traditionally followed by English
law with respect to the interpretation of written contracts, the latter concerns the
admissibility of evidence of prior negotiations, whether oral or written, to contra-
dict or supplement the express terms of the final written document, and derives
from the difficulty of establishing whether and if so to what extent the parties
intended that document to express their entire agreement. On the role of the parol
evidence rule in English law, see also CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 21, 12-
096.
33 See CHIT'r ON CONTRACTS, supra note 21, 12-042 (quoting Arbuthnott v.
Fagan, [1995] C.L.C. 1396, 1400) (stating that the current approach of the courts
to the construction of contracts is "neither uncompromisingly literal nor unswerv-
ingly purposive.").
34 Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. W. Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y, [1998] 1 W.L.R.
896, 912 (UKHL) (Eng.).
35 Id.
36 Sirius Int'l Ins. Co. v. F.A.I. Gen. Ins. Ltd., [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3251 (UKHL)
(Eng.).
[Vol. 19:9
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language."37 Moreover, as pointed out by Lord Wilberforce in
Reardon Smith Line v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen:38
No contracts are made in a vacuum; there is always a setting in
which they have to be placed. In a commercial contract . . . the
court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and
this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transac-
tion, the background, the context, the market in which the parties
are operating.39
It is with respect to whether, and if so to what extent, evidence
of the pre-contractual negotiations between the parties and
their subjective declarations of intent as to the meaning of the
words used should be admitted that opinions are still sharply
divided.
The prevailing view does not favor this type of evidence. To
quote Lord Hoffmann from Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd.
v. West Bromwich Building Society again, "[t]he law excludes
from the admissible background the previous negotiations of
the parties and their declarations of subjective intent."40 Ac-
cording to Lord Hoffmann, the reasons of "practical policy,"
which explain these exclusions, are of both theoretical and prac-
tical nature. On the one hand, the rule that evidence of the pre-
contractual negotiations of the parties or of their subsequent
conduct cannot be used to interpret a written contract is seen as
a corollary of the objective approach to contract interpretation
peculiar to English law which, as pointed out by Lord Steyn,
"serves the needs of commerce [and] tends to promote certainty
in the law and predictability in dispute resolution."41 On the
other hand, and more practically, it has been argued that:
[t]he reason for not admitting evidence of [the parties negotia-
tions] ... is simply that such evidence is unhelpful. By the nature
of the things, where negotiations are difficult, the parties' posi-
tions... are changing and until the final document, though con-
verging, still divergent. It is only the final document that records
37 Id. at 3258.
38 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Hansen-Tangen, (1976) 1 W.L.R. 989 (UKHL)
(Eng.).
39 Id. subsec. "Judgment - 1."
40 Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd., [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 913.
41 J. Steyn, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest
Men, 113 L.Q.R. 433, 433-34 (1997).
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a consensus. The only course then can be to try to ascertain the
"'natural' meaning."4 2
Yet, the majority view has also met with criticism. As recal-
led by Chief Lord Justice Mummery, as early as 1976 Justice
Kerr pointed out:
If a contract contains words which, in their context, are fairly ca-
pable of bearing more than one meaning, and if it is alleged that
the parties have in effect negotiated on an agreed basis that the
words bore only one of the two possible meanings, then it is per-
missible for the court to examine the extrinsic evidence relied
upon to see whether the parties have in fact used the words in
question in one sense only. 43
More recently, similar views have also been expressed in
legal writings. To quote one of the leading textbooks on English
contract law:
[T]he Court is not entitled to look at what the parties to the con-
tract said or did whist the matter was in negotiation, nor are
drafts or preliminary documents admissible in aid of its interpre-
tation, except where it is sought... to show that the parties nego-
tiated on an agreed basis that the words used bore a particular
meaning. 44
As Lord Nicholls stated:
[Tihere will be occasions where the pre-contract negotiations do
shed light on the meaning the parties intended to convey by the
words they used. There will be occasions, for instance, when the
parties in their pre-contract exchanges made clear the meaning
they intended by language they subsequently incorporated into
their contract. When pre-contract negotiations assist in some
way, the notional reasonable person should be able to take that
evidence into account in deciding how the contract is to be
interpreted. 4 5
Yet, the predominant exclusionary rules have been chal-
lenged beyond cases where there is ambiguity in the written
42 Prenn, 1 W.L.R. at 1384-85.
43 Partenreederei Karen Oltmann v. Scarsdale Shipping Co. Ltd., [19761 2
Lloyd's Rep. EWHC (Comm) 708, 712 (Eng.).
4 See CHIrY ON CoNTRAcTs, supra note 21, 12-119.
45 Donald Nicholls, My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words, 121
L.Q.R. 577, 583 (2005).
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document and the evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is
sought to show that the parties had attached a particular mean-
ing to the ambiguous phrase. Lord Nicholls and Professor
McMeel went much further.46 After examining the arguments
for and against the absolute prohibition of any evidence of the
actual intention of the parties for the purpose of interpreting
written agreements, they openly advocated, in general, "a liber-
alisation" of the traditional rules in this field47 and "a more flex-
ible approach . . . [permitting] courts to have regard, where
appropriate, to the meaning intended by both parties or the
meaning intended by one party where that party reasonably be-
lieves the other party accepted this meaning. '48 Significantly
enough, in this context both Professor McMeel and Lord Nich-
olls referred, as did Lord Justice Arden in the case at hand, to
"international restatements" such as the CISG49 and the
UNIDROIT Principles, 50 pointing out that "[they] all make pro-
vision to the effect that in interpreting contracts all the relevant
circumstances are to be considered including negotiations be-
tween the parties and any subsequent conduct of the parties."
51
"Adherence to the exclusionary rule as an absolute rule would
risk [the United Kingdom] becoming isolated on this point in
the field of commercial law."52
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO THE UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES AND CISG
Article 4.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides:
(1) A contract shall be interpreted according to the common inten-
tion of the parties.
46 See generally id.; see also Gerard McMeel, Prior Negotiations and Subse-
quent Conduct - The Next Step Forward for Contractual Interpretation, 119 L.Q.R.
272 (2003).
47 See McMeel, supra note 46, at 289, 296.
48 See Nicholls, supra note 45, at 586.
49 See CISG, supra note 3, art. 8.
50 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, cmts. to art. 4.1.
51 Actually both authors, unlike Lord Justice Arden, referred also to the rele-
vant provision of the Principles of European Contract Law. See McMeel, supra
note 46; see also Nicholls, supra note 45.
52 Nicholls, supra note 45.
2007]
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(2) If such an intention cannot be established, the contract shall
be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons
of the same kind as the parties would give to it in the same
circumstances. 5 3
Article 4.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides:
(1) The statements and other conduct of a party shall be inter-
preted according to that party's intention if the other party knew
or could not have been unaware of that intention.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, such statements
and other conduct shall be interpreted according to the meaning
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
would give to it in the same circumstances. 54
Article 4.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides:
In applying Articles 4.1 and 4.2, regard shall be had to all the
circumstances, including
(a) preliminary negotiations between the parties;
(b) practices which the parties have established between
themselves;
(c) the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the
contract;
(d) the nature and purpose of the contract;
(e) the meaning commonly given to terms and expressions in the
trade concerned;
(f) usages. 55
Article 8 of CISG provides:
(1) For the purpose of this Convention statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his in-
tent where the other party knew or could not have been aware
what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statement made
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to
the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as
the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a
reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be
given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the nego-
tiations, any practices which the parties have established be-
53 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, art. 4.1.
54 Id. art. 4.2.
55 Id. art. 4.3.
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tween themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the
parties.56
The two sets of provisions basically correspond except that,
for contingent reasons, CISG formally deals only with the inter-
pretation of unilateral statements and other conduct of a
party57 while the UNIDROIT Principles additionally address
also the interpretation of contracts. 58
Both instruments reject an exclusively subjective or exclu-
sively objective approach to contract interpretation and provide
for a combination the two. As pointed out in the Comments to
Article 4.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles, in determining the
meaning to be attached to the terms of the contract preference
is to be given to the intention common to the parties, but where
such common intention cannot be established, the contract shall
be interpreted in accordance with the meaning which reasona-
ble persons similar to the parties would give to it under similar
circumstances.5 9 Moreover, and even more importantly for the
present purposes, both the UNIDROIT Principles and CISG in-
dicate that among the circumstances which have to be taken
into consideration when applying both the "subjective" test and
the "reasonableness" test are the preliminary negotiations be-
tween the parties and the conduct of the parties subsequent to
the conclusion of the contract. 60
The approach taken by the two instruments with respect to
contract interpretation reflects the current prevailing trend at
the international level and, as such, has met with the approval
of commentators from both civil law and common law jurisdic-
tions. 61 Interestingly enough, while at the Vienna Diplomatic
56 See CISG, supra note 3, art. 8.
57 For the legislative history of CISG Article 8, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Inter-
pretation of Contract, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE VI-
ENNA SALES CONVENTION 95-97 (Cesare Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim
Bonell eds., Giufree 1987) [hereinafter Farnsworth].
58 See generally, UNIDROIT, supra note 5.
59 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, art. 4.1, cmts. 1, 2.
60 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, art. 4.3; see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 8
(3); see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule,
Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, 3.3, 23 October 2004. Rapporteur:
Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law School, Camden, NJ, USA, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op3.html.
61 With respect to the CISG, see generally Farnsworth, supra note 57. See
also J.O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES, 115-23 (Kluwer Law
2007]
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Conference for the adoption of CISG in 1980, the delegation of
the United Kingdom opposed - though unsuccessfully, also in
view of the fact that none of the other common law delegations
took the same position - the inclusion of Article 8 on the ground
that it adopted too subjective an approach. 62 Ten years later, in
the preparation of the UNIDROIT Principles, Articles 4.1 to 4.3
provided essentially the same solution.6 3
The provisions under consideration have been received fa-
vorably also in international case law as demonstrated by the
many decisions rendered worldwide by domestic courts and ar-
bitral tribunals applying Article 8 CISG and/or Articles 4.1 - 4.3
of the UNIDROIT Principles to settle disputes concerning con-
tract interpretation. 64 Particularly significant for the present
purposes are, in addition to ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The Rugby
Group Ltd. here under consideration, the decisions recently ren-
dered by the Court of Appeals of New Zealand in Yoshimoto v.
Canterbury Golf Int'l Ltd.6 5 and by the English High Court in
Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Lithuania.66
Int'l 3d ed. 1999). See also Martin Schmidt-Kessell, Article 8, in COMMENTARY ON
THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 111-40 (Peter
Schlectriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., Geoffrey Thomas trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. 2005) (1998). With respect to the UNIDROIT Principles, see generally
A. BAUMANN, REGELN DER AUSLEGUNG INTERNATIONALER HANDELSGESCHAFTE. EINE
VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG DER UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, DER PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, DES UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE UND DES DEUTSCHEN
RECHTS 58 (V&R Unipress 2004).
62 See U.N. Conference on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Mar. 10 - Apr. 11, 1980, Summary Records - First Committee, 6th mtg., U.N. Doc
A/Conf.97/C.1/Sr/6 (Mar. 14, 1980). This Summary Record also identifies the dif-
ferent position taken in this respect by the delegates of the United States and of
Australia. Id.
63 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, arts. 4.1, 4.3. An English expert together
with his colleagues from the United States, Australia and Ghana concurred. For a
summary record of the Working Group's deliberations on this point, see
UNIDROIT 1991 - Study L - Misc 15, 6-17, 22-29 (Working Group for the Prepa-
ration of Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1991).
64 See generally UNILEX, http://www.unilex.info (containing a database for
the CISG and UNIDROIT case law). (For CISG, follow "CISG" hyperlink; then
follow "By Article & Issue" hyperlink under "Cases"; then search "8" under "Article
#" hyperlink. For UNIDROIT, follow "UNIDROIT Principles" hyperlink; then fol-
low "By Article and Issue" hyperlink under "Cases"; then search under "Article #"
hyperlink).
65 Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf Int'l Ltd., [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 2000
N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 118 (C.A.).
66 Swenska Petroleum Exploration A.B. v. Lithuania, [2005] 1 EWHC (Comm)
2437, (2006) 1 All E.R. 731 (Eng.).
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Yoshimoto concerned a contract for the sale of shares of a
business for the planned development of a golf course in New
Zealand by a Japanese businessman to a New Zealand corpora-
tion.67 The contract contained a clause stating that the pay-
ment of the last installment was subject to the condition
precedent that the purchaser obtain "all necessary authoriza-
tions or resource consents to the development" within a given
period of time.68 A dispute arose when the New Zealand corpo-
ration refused to pay the last installment on the ground that not
all authorizations necessary to commence the development of
the project had been obtained. 69 The Japanese seller objected
that the clause in question referred only to those authorizations
contemplated by the parties at the time of conclusion of the con-
tract, and since the only missing consent was one that had be-
come necessary only afterwards, the condition precedent
envisaged in the clause had been fulfilled; contrary to the court
of first instance, the Court of Appeal unanimously decided in
favour of the Japanese seller.70
In a very elaborated and learned opinion, Judge Thomas
conceded that on the basis of a strictly objective interpretation
of the clause in question the conclusion might have been differ-
ent, while only by taking into account the pre-contractual nego-
tiations between the parties and their declarations of intention
would it become clear that the parties actually attached to the
clause in question the meaning contended by the Japanese
seller.71 However, although pointing out that the admission of
such extrinsic evidence would be in accordance with Article 8 of
CISG, in force in New Zealand, as well as with Articles 4.1 to
4.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles which he described as a "docu-
ment which is in the nature of a restatement of the commercial
contract law of the world [and which] refines and expands the
principles contained in the United Nations Convention," he de-
cided not to take a similar approach in the case at hand and to
stick to a literal or objective interpretation of the clause in ques-
tion.72 Indeed, he argued, desirable as it may be for the courts
67 Yoshimoto, [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 2000 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 118 (C.A) [2].
68 Id. [12].
69 Id. [3]-[4], (14].
70 Id. [15], [96]-[103].
71 Id. [301435].
72 Id. [88]-[89].
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in New Zealand to bring the law in line with the international
instruments mentioned above, the Privy Council in London
would not permit them to do so as England has not yet adopted
the CISG and English common law was traditionally against
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of inter-
preting written agreements. 73
Svenska Petroleum, decided by the English High Court,
concerned a joint venture agreement between a Swedish petro-
leum company and a previously state-owned Lithuanian petro-
leum company for oil exploitation in Lithuania.74  The
agreement contained an arbitration clause indicating that the
"founders" (i.e. the two incorporating shareholders) would sub-
mit their disputes to arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbi-
tration, and that the applicable law was that of Lithuania
"supplemented, where required, by rules of international busi-
ness activities generally accepted in the petroleum industry if
they do not contradict the law . . . of Lithuania."75 The agree-
ment also contained a separate provision stating that "[t]he
Government of... Lithuania hereby approves the above agree-
ment and acknowledges itself to be legally and contractually
bound as if the Government were a signatory to the Agree-
ment. '76 When a dispute regarding performance of the agree-
ment arose, the Swedish company sued not only its Lithuanian
partner but also the Government of Lithuania. The latter ob-
jected that sovereign immunity shielded it from liability, and
even if sovereign immunity did not protect it, the arbitration
clause was binding only on the two "founders" of the joint ven-
ture.77 The claimant insisted that the Government of Lithua-
nia, though not a "founder," was nevertheless subject to the
arbitration clause because it signed the abovementioned sepa-
rate clause in the agreement according to which it would be con-
tractually bound as if it were a signatory to the agreement. 78
73 The Privy Council actually revised the decision of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal without however re-examining the law on the question raised by Judge
Thomas. See Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf Int'l Ltd., [2002] UKHL 40 (discussing
the lower court's failure to give meaning to the terms of the contract other than
their plain and obvious meaning).
74 Svenska, [2005] 1 EWHC (Comm) 2437, [1]-[2].
75 Id. [24], [261.
76 Id. [13].
77 Id. [27].
78 Id. [8].
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On appeal from an arbitral award in favour of the claimant,
Judge Gloster considered both the issue of whether the Govern-
ment of Lithuania had waived sovereign immunity and whether
it had agreed to arbitration. 79 In dealing with this latter issue,
she examined the relevant rules of contract interpretation con-
tained in Articles 6.193 to 6.195 of the Lithuanian Civil Code,
and also extensively quoted the commentary by an eminent
Lithuanian scholar pointing out that those articles "repeat Arti-
cles 4.1 to 4.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles."80 Noting that con-
trary to English law, the above-mentioned rules of contract
interpretation allow for a greater amount of factual material to
assist in interpreting the meaning of a contract. In particular,
it allows for evidence of pre-contractual negotiations and each
party's subjective intent, Judge Gloster considered the pre-con-
tractual negotiations, including previous drafts of the agree-
ment, and in the light of the evidence concluded that the
Government of Lithuania had waived sovereign immunity and
was bound by the arbitration clause.81
V. APPENDIX: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN THE
PRESENCE OF AN "ENTIRE AGREEMENT CLAUSE"
As will be recalled in ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The Rugby
Group Ltd., the agreement between the parties contained a
clause stating "[t]his Agreement. .. constitutes the entire con-
tract between the parties and supersedes all prior representa-
tions, agreements, negotiations or understandings whether oral
or in writing."8 2 In the first decision, Justice Field held that the
effect of this clause was that all superseded matters, including
the pre-contractual negotiations between the parties, were to
have no bearing on the meaning of the agreement.8 3 On appeal,
Lord Justice Mummery found, to the contrary, that it was rea-
sonably arguable that by this clause the parties actually in-
tended to exclude only ascertaining the contents of their written
contract by reference to prior representations, agreements, ne-
gotiations and understandings, but not to inhibit ascertaining
79 Id. [281.
80 Id. [30].
81 Id. [31].
82 ProForce, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 69, [111.
83 Rugby Group Ltd. v. ProForce Ltd., [2005] EWHC 70 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
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the meaning of a term in their contract by reference to pre-con-
tract materials.8 4
While the CISG does not deal with "entire agreement" or
"merger" clauses,8 5 the UNIDROIT Principles contain a specific
provision, Article 2.1.17,86 regarding them. According to Article
2.1.17:
A contract in writing which contains a clause indicating that the
writing completely embodies the terms on which the parties have
agreed cannot be contradicted or supplemented by evidence of
prior statements or agreements. However, such statements or
agreements may be used to interpret the writing.8 7
This is not the place to examine in greater detail the extent to
which this provision corresponds to the approach taken by the
various domestic laws with respect to the effects of "entire
agreement" or "merger" clauses.88 Rather, what is important to
note is that according to the UNIDROIT Principles, unless
clearly stated otherwise by the parties, prior statements or
agreements are not deprived of any relevance by such clauses
but may still be used as a means of interpreting the written
document.8 9 Since this is basically also the conclusion reached
by Lord Justice Mummery in the case at hand, why exclude the
possibility that the UNIDROIT Principles, even though not ex-
pressly mentioned in his opinion, also on this occasion served as
a source of inspiration.
VI. CONCLUSION
Among the different ways in which the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples can be employed in practice, the Preamble expressly states
that "[t]hey may be used to interpret or supplement domestic
law."90 Over the years arbitral tribunals as well as domestic
84 ProForce, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 69, [35]-[36].
85 By virtue of Art. 6 of the CISG, which states the principle of party auton-
omy, the parties are of course free to stipulate such clauses in their contract. See
generally Farnsworth, supra note 57.
86 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, art. 2.17.
87 See id.
88 For an extensive comparative analysis of the laws of Germany, England
and the United States, see S. KAUFMANN, Parol Evidence Rule and Merger Clauses,
in INTERNATIONALEN EINHEITSRECHT 204 (2004).
89 Id. at 304.
90 See UNIDROIT, supra note 5, pmbl., T 6.
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courts all over the world have extensively taken advantage of
this possibility, referring in their decisions to specific provisions
of the UNIDROIT Principles to interpret or supplement the ap-
plicable domestic law or simply to corroborate the solution pro-
vided by that law. 91 The question of the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence under English law, in particular evidence of
pre-contractual negotiation and parties' declarations of intent,
for the purpose of interpreting written agreements is highly
controversial. In recent times several voices have been raised
in support of the relaxation of the traditional exclusionary rules
and the adoption of a more liberal approach in line with the in-
ternational prevailing view. The opinions of Lord Justice Mum-
mery and Lady Justice Arden in ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. The
Rugby Group Ltd. are only the most recent, though particularly
authoritative, ones. The references they contain to the
UNIDROIT Principles and CISG are a remarkable demonstra-
tion of the increasing openness of English courts towards for-
eign and international sources of inspiration.
91 For an extensive analysis of the international caselaw in this respect see
MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW
294-300 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 3d ed. 2005).
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